Cadets will examine a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. Identify the nature of the threat and the strategy adopted by government forces to end the insurgency. Identify what tactics (both military and non-military) were utilized in an attempt to pacify the populace. Which tactics were most/least successful and why? What effects did these tactics have on the local population? Was the overall operation successful or not, and why?

Examples include (but are not limited to):

1. General Works on Counterinsurgency Operations
2. Philippine-American War (1899-1902)
5. Operation Iraqi Freedom (aka Iraq War, 2003 to September 2010)
8. Israeli COIN and the Intifadas (Palestinian uprisings, 1987-93 & 2000-05)
9. Other Counterinsurgencies
1. **General Works on Counterinsurgency Operations**

**Reference:**

U 240 .E68 2013 (Reference)

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Part One: The Philippine Insurrection; Part Two: The War in Algeria; Part Three: The Malayan Emergency; Part Four: The Vietnam War  
U 241 .A765 2009

U 240 .B434 2001

U 240 .B637 2016

U 240 .B656 2013b

Contents:  
Chapter 1--Introduction; Chapter 2--Concepts that shape counterinsurgency assessment; Chapter 3--Centralized assessment theory and pattern and trend analysis; Chapter 4--The effects-based approach to assessment; Chapter 5--Choosing core metrics; Chapter 6--Vietnam-era assessment; Chapter 7--Assessment in Afghanistan; Chapter 8--Why does centralized assessment fail in counterinsurgency?; Chapter 9--Conclusions, recommendations, and options; Chapter 10--A proposed alternative to centralized assessment  
MG-1086-DOD
UGK 251 .C683 2003

U 241 .C678 20008

U 167.5 .I8 C73 2014


Contents: Introduction : quagmire -- When to battle insurgents -- Classic COIN strategy -- COIN and compromise -- The disadvantage of foreign occupiers -- The guerrilla advantage -- COIN forces' advantages : firepower, numbers, and technology -- Time favors the insurgents -- COIN wars : the political aspects -- The guerrilla win and external support -- The United States and politically dominated wars -- Prospects for pending COIN wars (U.S. Occupation of Iraq, U.S. Occupation of Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency from the Air: The Drone Wars in Yemen and Somalia, The General War on Terror) -- U.S. track record on COIN : implications for forces and weapons -- The domestic effects of overseas counterinsurgency wars (Vietnam War, The War on Terror, Conclusion).
U 241 .E53 2013

Contents: Introduction: Counterinsurgency and the uses of history
Chapter 1, The Army's counterinsurgency war in Vietnam
Chapter 2, "Out of the rice paddies": The 1970s and the decline of counterinsurgency
Chapter 3, Low intensity conflict in the Reagan years
Chapter 4, Peacekeeping and operations other than war in the 1990s
Chapter 5, Mr. Rumsfeld's war: Transformation, doctrine and planning for Iraq
Chapter 6, Counterinsurgency and "Vietnam" in Iraq 2003-2006
Chapter 7, The return to counterinsurgency: FM 3-24 and the "surge"
Chapter 8, A never-ending war?: The renegotiation of "Vietnam" in Afghanistan


Chapter One--The Evolution of Irregular Warfare; Chapter Two--The British Withdrawal from Iraq, 1920s; Chapter Three--The French Withdrawal from Algeria, 1962; Chapter Four--The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1989; Chapter Five--The U.S. Withdrawal from Somalia, 1994; Chapter Six--The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon, 2000; Chapter Seven--The Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, 2005; Chapter Eight--Lessons Learned and Recommendations


Chapter 1, Malaya-between two terrors: "people's history" and the Malayan Emergency
Chapter 2, The Philippines-"engendering" counterinsurgency: the battle to win the hearts and minds of women during the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines
Chapter 3, Vietnam-uprooting the revolution: counterinsurgency in Vietnam
Chapter 4, El Salvador-the creation of the internal enemy: pondering the legacies of U.S anticommmunism, counterinsurgency, and authoritarianism in El Salvador (1952-81)
Chapter 5, Iraq, part I-counterinsurgency in Iraq
Chapter 6, Iraq, part II-February 2006-December 2012: new allies, old tactics
Chapter 7, Afghanistan, part I-"you have to not mind killing innocents": American COIN operations in Afghanistan and the violence of empire
Chapter 8, Afghanistan, part II-counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: myth or reality?


Contents:
Chapter --American Guerrillas: The War of Independent; Chapter 2--Confederate Guerillas: The War of Secession; Chapter 3--The Philippine War: Forgotten Victory; Chapter 4--Nicaragua: A Training Ground; Chapter 5--Greece: Civil War into Cold War; Chapter 6--Back to the Philippines: The Huks; Chapter 7--
Vietnam: A Case of Multiple Pathologies; Chapter 8--El Salvador: A Long War in a Small Country; Chapter 9--Afghanistan: Cracking the Red Empire; Chapter 10--Implications and Provocations  


Chapter 1, The Accidental Guerrilla  
Chapter 3, “The Twenty-First Day”: Iraq during the Surge, 2007  
Chapter 4, “Terrain, Tribes and Terrorists”: Conflicts from Indonesia to Europe  
Chapter 5, “Turning an Elephant into a Mouse”: Beyond the War on Terrorism  

Chapter 1, A “happy combination of clemency with firmness”: the small wars prologue  
Chapter 2, The road from Sedan  
Chapter 3, The paroxysms of imperial might in the shadow of the Great War  
Chapter 4, From Tipperary to Tel Aviv: British counterinsurgency in the World War II Era  
Chapter 5, From small wars to *la guerre subversive*: the radicalization and collapse of French counterinsurgency  
Chapter 6, Vietnam, counterinsurgency, and the American way of war  
Chapter 7, “A conspiracy of heroes”: revolution and counterinsurgency in Latin America
Chapter 8, Building the “most successful counterinsurgency school”: COIN as the British way of war
Chapter 9, Britain’s Thirty Years’ War in Northern Ireland
Chapter 10, Vietnam with a happy ending: Iraq and the “the surge”


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See Chapter 3, The Philippine War: Forgotten Victory, pp. 103-129
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